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Summary: On 6 October 2015, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) issued the final ruling in Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner (Case C-362/14). In its ruling the Court invalidated the 
Safe Harbour arrangement, which governs data transfers between 
the EU and the US. While the decision does not automatically put an 
end to data transfers from Europe to the United States, it allows each 
country’s national regulators to suspend transfers if the company in 
the United States does not adequately protect user data. The paper 
analyses the most important aspects of the judgment: the Court’s defi-
nition of the competences of national data protection authorities, the 
Court’s interpretation of the criteria for ‘adequacy’ under Article 25(6) 
of Directive 95/46/EC and the reasoning of the Court for the invalida-
tion of the Safe Harbour Agreement. Further, and in line with the find-
ings of the Court, the paper analyses the relationship between state 
surveillance and data protection and examines the consequences of 
the Court’s ruling.
1 Introduction
On 6 October 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) issued the final ruling in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner 
(Case C-362/14).
In its ruling the Court invalidated the Safe Harbour arrangement, 
which governs data transfers between the EU and the US. While the deci-
sion does not automatically put an end to data transfers from Europe to 
the United States, it allows each country’s national regulators to suspend 
transfers if the company in the United States does not adequately protect 
user data.
Consequently, US companies are no longer allowed to transfer pri-
vate data from the EU to the US solely on the basis that they are mem-
bers of the Safe Harbour scheme. Instead they will have to seek specific 
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contractual authorisation to export data.1 US companies say this will 
increase costs, create delays and force them to duplicate US data servers 
in the EU.2
Obviously, the ruling will have a big impact on businesses that trans-
fer personal data to a company of the same group or a service provider in 
the US. It affects giant social networks such as Facebook, search engines 
like Google, cloud hosting providers such as Microsoft, and thousands of 
other companies that do business in the EU and that transfer personal 
data to the US. 
Accordingly, the judgment has attracted great public attention and 
has received the status of a ‘landmark’ and ‘historical’ decision in the 
area of data protection.3
However, perhaps the most important aspect of the ruling is that it 
raises the issue of mass surveillance and emphasises the need for bal-
ance between national security protection demands and respect for the 
protection of private data as a fundamental right. The recent increase in 
terrorist attacks worldwide has most certainly triggered broad measures 
allowing intelligence services to introduce even wider actions in the hope 
of preventing further violence, which makes this case even more relevant.
2 Background
The Schrems case was initiated by Maximillian Schrems, an Austrian 
student and a Facebook subscriber, who challenged Facebook’s transfer 
of his personal data to the US under the Safe Harbour Agreement.
Schrems made a complaint to the Irish Data Protection Commission-
er, due to the fact that all Facebook subscribers residing in the European 
Union are asked to sign a contract with Facebook Ireland, a subsidiary of 
the parent company Facebook Inc established in the US. 
1 For alternative bases for transfers of EU personal data to the US, see: Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Transfer of Per-
sonal Data from the EU to the United States of America under Directive 95/46/EC following 
the Judgment by the Court of Justice in Case C-362/14 (Schrems) COM (2015) 566 final. 
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sites/thomasbrewster/2015/10/06/safe-harbour-invalid/>  all accessed 28 November 
2015.
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Some or all of the data of subscribers to Facebook Ireland residing in 
the EU are transferred to Facebook Inc servers in the US, where they are 
kept. The substantive law governing these transfers of personal data is 
the Safe Harbour Agreement between the EU and the US. This Agreement 
was put into effect in 2000 by a Commission decision4 which was adopted 
pursuant to Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive5 (Directive). The 
Directive provides for the requirement that the transfer of personal data 
to a third country may take place only if the third country in question 
ensures an adequate level of data protection. Article 25(6) of the Directive 
provides that the European Commission may find that a third country 
ensures an adequate level of protection. If the Commission adopts a deci-
sion to that effect (adequacy decision), the transfer of personal data to the 
third country concerned may take place. 
In this regard, the Commission adopted the Safe Harbour Agreement 
for US businesses. Within the Safe Harbour regime, all US companies 
subject to the Agreement were authorised to proceed with data transfers 
without requiring the individual authorisation of national data protection 
authorities of the EU country in question. More than 4,000 US compa-
nies have been certified under the Safe Harbour programme.6 Among 
those certified are some of the world’s largest corporations and informa-
tion service providers.
According to the established regime, a US company that seeks to 
comply with the Safe Harbour must: (a) identify in its publicly available 
privacy policy that it adheres to the Safe Harbour principles and actually 
does comply with them; and (b) self-certify, ie declare to the US Depart-
ment of Commerce that it is in compliance with the Safe Harbour prin-
ciples. The self-certification must be resubmitted on an annual basis.7 
A number of mechanisms, combining private dispute resolution and 
oversight by the public authorities, exist to check compliance with the 
Safe Harbour principles. The adequacy decision permits the limitation of 
these principles, ‘to the extent necessary to meet national security, public 
interest, or law enforcement requirements’ and 
4 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the 
safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US 
Department of Commerce (notified under document number C(2000) 2441) (Text with EEA 
relevance) [2000] OJ  L215/7.
5 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
6 The full list of companies is available at ‘US-EU Safe Habour List’ (Export.Gov) <https://
safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx> accessed 28 November 2015. 
7 More information at ‘Safe Habor’ (Export.Gov) <http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/in-
dex.asp> accessed 28 November 2015.
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by statute, government regulation, or case law that create 
conflicting obligations or explicit authorisations, provided 
that, in exercising any such authorisation, an organisation 
can demonstrate that its non-compliance with the Principles 
is limited to the extent necessary to meet the overriding legiti-
mate interests furthered by such authorisation.8 
As the Schrems case will reveal, it is questionable whether this provi-
sions of the Decision are in accordance with the Data Protection Directive 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.9
Schrems claimed, in essence, that the law and practices of the US 
offer no real protection of personal data against US state surveillance. 
Concretely, he claimed that, according to the allegations raised by Ed-
ward Snowden, the US National Security Agency (NSA) through the 
PRISM programme obtained unrestricted rights to intercept and survey 
data (including personal data) held by Safe Harbour participants in the 
US, including Facebook.
The Irish Data Protection Commissioner rejected Schrems’ complaint 
on the basis that, according to the Irish statute, the adequacy decision 
was final, and he was bound to allow the transfer of personal data under 
the EU/US Safe Harbour regime. 
Schrems subsequently brought proceedings before the Irish High 
Court against the Irish Data Protection Commissioner for his refusal to 
investigate and suspend the data flows. The High Court found that if the 
matter were to be determined solely by Irish law, it would have to end the 
case. It recognised, however, that implementation of EU law must be car-
ried out in the light of the EU Charter. Therefore, the Irish High Court, 
which doubted that Safe Harbour system was compatible with EU law (or 
indeed the Irish Constitution), stayed the proceedings and submitted the 
following two questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling:10 
Whether in the course of determining a complaint which has 
been made to an independent office holder who has been 
vested by statute with the functions of administering and 
enforcing data protection legislation that personal data is 
being transferred to another third country (in this case, the 
United States of America) the laws and practices of which, it 
is claimed, do not contain adequate protections for the data 
8 Lorna Woods, ‘Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner: The Beginning of the End for 
Safe Harbour?’ (Information Law and Policy Centre at IALS, 23 September 2015) <http://
infolawcentre.blogs.sas.ac.uk/> accessed 28 November 2015
9 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/8, 18 December 
2000; [2010] OJ C83/389, 30 March 2010. 
10 Case C‑362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
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subject, that office holder is absolutely bound by the Commu-
nity finding to the contrary contained in Commission Decision 
of 26 July 2000 (2000/520/EC1) having regard to Article 7, 
Article 8 and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (2000/C 364/012), the provisions of 
Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC3 notwithstanding?
Or, alternatively, may and/or must the office holder conduct 
his or her own investigation of the matter in the light of fac-
tual developments in the meantime since that Commission 
Decision was first published?
3 Judgment 
Prior to the final ruling, the Advocate General Yves Bot issued on 23 
September 2015 his non-binding legal opinion on the case according to 
which he indicated that the Safe Harbour Agreement for data transfer be-
tween the EU and US fails to protect the privacy of EU citizens and must 
be declared invalid. More concretely, he stated that the Commission’s 
decision could not limit the powers of data protection authorities granted 
under the Directive and that the US system was inadequate, particularly 
as regards the safeguards against mass surveillance. 
The opinion has triggered a lively debate, during which the US Mis-
sion to the EU issued a statement calling the Advocate General’s opinion 
into question.11 
However, the final ruling of the CJEU is very much in line with the 
Advocate General’s opinion. According to the CJEU, national regulatory 
bodies, such as the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, can investigate 
whether or not the US affords an adequate level of protection, and could 
contradict the European Commission’s decision that the Safe Harbour pro-
vides an adequate level of protection of personal data for EU citizens. More-
over, in accordance with the Advocate General’s opinion, the Court has 
gone further and said that the adequacy decision is invalid since the Safe 
Harbour agreement does not offer a level of data protection equivalent to 
the level of protection in place in the EU. In particular, the Court found that 
the access enjoyed by the US intelligence services to the transferred data 
interferes with the right to respect for private life and the right to protection 
of EU citizens’ personal data both guaranteed under the EU Charter. 
In the following paragraphs the most important aspects of the judg-
ment are analysed: the Court’s definition of the competences of national 
11 ‘Safe Harbor Protects Privacy and Provides Trust in Data Flows that Underpin Transat-
lantic Trade’ (United States Mission to the European Union, 28 September 2015) <http://
useu.usmission.gov/st-09282015.html> accessed 28 November 2015.
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data protection authorities, the Court’s interpretation of the criteria for 
‘adequacy’ and the reasoning of the Court for the invalidation of the Safe 
Harbour Agreement. 
3.1 The powers of data protection authorities 
In line with the previous case law and the Advocate General’s 
opinion,12 in its ruling the Court emphasised the importance of the pro-
tection of personal data as a fundamental right to respect for private 
life, guaranteed by Article 7 of the EU Charter, and the fundamental 
right to the protection of personal data, guaranteed by Article 8 thereof. 
The Court stated that the Directive, which must be read in the context 
of the Charter, has no provision that prevents oversight by the national 
data protection authorities of transfers of personal data to third countries 
which have been the subject of an adequacy decision. The Court had 
previously ascertained that the supervisory authorities are the guardians 
of fundamental rights and freedoms put at stake by data processing op-
erations.13 Their independence is an essential element of protection and 
cannot be restricted in any way.14
In line with the above, the Court held that individuals had the right 
to complain to and ask a national authority to investigate the protection 
of their personal data. Further, the Court explained the different roles of 
national data protection authorities, national courts and the CJEU in the 
process.15 
According to the ruling, the data protection authorities remain re-
sponsible for oversight of data processing on their territory, which in-
cludes the transfer of personal data outside the EU. Thus, even if the 
Commission has adopted an adequacy decision, the national data pro-
tection authorities, when dealing with a claim, must be able to examine, 
with complete independence, whether the transfer of a person’s data to a 
third country complies with the requirements laid down by the Directive.
At the same time, the Court states that Commission decisions are 
binding and benefit from a presumption of legality, as stated in recital 52 
of the judgment:
.... until such time as the Commission decision is declared in-
valid by the Court, the Member States and their organs, which 
include their independent supervisory authorities, admittedly 
12 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, Opinion of Advo-
cate General Bot ECLI:EU:C:2015:627, recital 72. 
13 Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2014:237.
14 Fanny Coudert, ‘Schrems vs Data Protection Commissioner: A Slap on the Wrist for the 
Commission and New Powers for Data Protection Authorities (European Law Blog, 15 Octo-
ber 2015). <http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2931> accessed 28 November 2015.
15 Schrems (n 10) recital 38-66.
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cannot adopt measures contrary to that decision, such as 
acts intended to determine with binding effect that the third 
country covered by it does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection. Measures of the EU institutions are in principle 
presumed to be lawful and accordingly produce legal effects 
until such time as they are withdrawn, annulled in an action 
for annulment or declared invalid following a reference for a 
preliminary ruling or a plea of illegality ...16
Therefore, the CJEU distinguishes between the right and power of 
investigation of and challenge to Commission decisions, and the declara-
tion of the invalidity of such decisions. While the former remains with na-
tional data protection authorities as described above, the latter, following 
longstanding jurisprudence,17 remains within the CJEU.
The Court explains that data protection authorities must consider 
claims challenging adequacy decisions seriously. If a data protection au-
thority thinks that a claim is unfounded, the complainant can challenge 
its decision before the relevant national court, which must refer the is-
sue of the validity of the decision to the CJEU if it thinks it may be well 
founded. If, on the other hand, the data protection authority thinks the 
complaint is well founded, there must be rules in national law allowing 
the data protection authority to go before the national courts in order to 
have the issue referred to the CJEU. As mentioned in some of the reviews 
of the judgment, it is unfortunate that the Court did not consider the 
alternative route of the national data protection authority calling on the 
Commission to amend its decision, and bringing a failure to act proceed-
ing directly before the CJEU.18
We can conclude that the judgment defines three aspects of the com-
petences of data protection authorities with regard to the adequacy deci-
sion: they are obliged to examine complaints from individuals regarding 
the treatment of their personal information by other countries; they are 
entitled to bring cases in front of the national court to question the valid-
ity of adequacy decisions; and they are entitled to suspend the transfer of 
personal information to other countries when they believe it is appropriate.
The above defined powers of the data protection authorities have 
largely challenged the current understanding of the binding nature of the 
EU adequacy decisions.19
16 Schrems (n10) recital 52.
17 See  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost ECLI:EU:C:1987:452.3
18 Steve Peers, ‘The Party’s Over: EU Data Protection Law after the Schrems Safe Har-
bour Judgment’ (EU Law Analysis, 7 October 2015) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.
hr/2015/10/the-partys-over-eu-data-protection-law.html> accessed 28 November 2015.
19 Eg see Stephen Lawson, ‘With Safe Harbor Gone, the Hard Work on Data Transfers 
Starts Now’ (PCWorld, 6 October 2015) <http://www.pcworld.com/article/2990023/with-
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3.2 Definition of adequacy 
Article 25(6) of the Directive gives the Commission the power to de-
cide that transfers of personal data outside the EU receive an ‘adequate 
level of protection’ in particular countries. The CJEU stated that the Di-
rective gives no definition of what is required in order to ensure protec-
tion under the adequacy decision, so it has to interpret the rules. 
According to the CJEU, there are two aspects that have to be taken 
into consideration when examining an adequacy decision. Article 25(1) of 
the Directive states the requirement that the level of data protection has 
to be ‘adequate’ and Article 25(6) states that the protection has to be ‘en-
sured’. The CJEU agreed with the Advocate General’s opinion that Article 
25 is ‘intended to ensure that the high level of that protection continues 
where personal data is transferred to a third country’.20 That requirement 
does not, however, mean that protection in third countries must be iden-
tical, but rather that it is ‘essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within 
the European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read in the light of the 
Charter’21 and ‘effective in order to ensure protection essentially equiva-
lent to that guaranteed within the European Union’.22 
Therefore, the Court interprets the word ‘adequate’ as requiring a 
high level of protection of private data in the third country. That high 
level of protection does not have to be identical to the EU standard, but 
must, as cited above, be ‘substantially equivalent’ to that in the EU and 
must be  ‘effective’. Otherwise, the objective of ensuring a high level of 
protection would not be met, and the EU’s internal standards for domes-
tic data protection could easily be avoided. Also, the Court states that the 
means used in the third state to ensure data protection rights must be 
‘effective…in practice’, although they ‘may differ’ from those in the EU.
Furthermore, the Court says that the Commission has to check pe-
riodically whether the original assessment that protection is adequate 
is still justified, and has to check in any event when new evidence gives 
rise to a doubt whether that is so. In this regard, the Court’s judgment 
requires that any adequacy decision is based on a broad analysis of the 
third country domestic laws and international commitments.
As to the Safe Harbour adequacy decision, we have to mention that 
the European Commission issued communications on the implementa-
safe-harbor-gone-the-hard-work-on-data-transfers-starts-now.html> accessed 28 Novem-
ber 2015.
20 Schrems (n 10) recital 72.
21 Schrems (n 10) recital 73.
22 Schrems (n 10) recital 74.
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tion of the Safe Harbour Agreement in 2002,23 200424 and, following the 
revelations on US surveillance programmes, in 2013,25 in which it repeat-
edly reported on weaknesses in transparency and weaknesses in the en-
forcement of the Safe Harbour arrangement; however, it failed to take ac-
tion and review the adequacy decision. This is why the Court then states 
that in light of the importance of privacy and data protection, and the 
large number of persons whose rights will be affected if data are trans-
ferred to a third country with an inadequate level of data protection, the 
Commission has reduced discretion, and is subject to judicial review.26
3.3 Invalidation of the Safe Harbour 
Following the above-established interpretation of rules and proce-
dure, the CJEU examined the validity of the Safe Harbour Agreement.
Contrary to the Attorney General’s opinion, the CJEU does not focus 
its analysis on an assessment of the legitimacy of the US surveillance 
programme – the factual basis of this analysis was highly contested by 
the US Mission to the EU and by US scholars. Instead, it analyses the 
decision in light of the requirements imposed by Article 25(6).27
In the judgment, the Court quoted the Commission’s 2013 Review28 
of the Safe Harbour decision which found that US authorities could ac-
cess personal data transferred from the EU, and then process the data 
for purposes incompatible with the original transfer beyond what was 
strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of national secu-
rity, and that there was no administrative or judicial means to ensure 
access to the data and their rectification or erasure.
The Court held that the system of self-certification of a company, 
in which a company declares it will obey the data protection principles 
as envisaged under the Safe Harbour Agreement, could only constitute 
a reliable measure of adequacy if the same was backed by mechanisms 
23 Commission Staff Working Paper, ‘The Application of Commission Decision 520/2000/
EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy 
Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of Com-
merce’ SEC (2002) 196, 14 February 2002. 
24 Commission Staff Working Document ‘The Implementation of Commission Decision 
520/2000/EC on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided by the Safe Harbour 
Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions issued by the US Department of 
Commerce’ SEC (2004) 1323, 20 October 2004. 
25 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies 
Established in the EU, COM (2013) 847.
26 Steve Peers (n 18).
27 Coudert (n 14).3
28 Commission (n 25).
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to identify and punish US companies which do not obey Safe Harbour 
principles. In line with the cited Commission’s Review, the Court came to 
the conclusion that the Safe Harbour arrangement does not have in place 
that kind of mechanism and the rules could be overridden by national 
security requirements set out in US law.
Additionally, the Court concluded that in the context of state surveil-
lance, while EU law, interpreted in the light of the Charter and the prior 
case law, limit state interference to what is strictly necessary, the adequa-
cy decision allows US authorities to store all personal data on a general 
basis. Such a general collection and processing of data, ie mass surveil-
lance, without the possibility of an effective remedy, the Court declared, 
constitutes a violation of the rights guaranteed under the Charter.29
Finally, Article 3 of the adequacy decision restricted data protection 
authorities’ competence to take action to prevent data transfers in the 
event of an inadequate level of data protection in the USA. According to 
the previously defined roles and responsibilities of the data protection 
authorities, this was also declared contrary to the data protection Direc-
tive (read in light of the EU Charter).
According to the described findings, the Court declared the entire 
Decision invalid. The Court did not limit the effect of its ruling.
Following the judgment, the European Commission issued a guid-
ance document30 in which it noted that all the other adequacy decisions 
that the European Commission had issued for third countries pursu-
ant to Article 25(6) of the Directive31 contain a limitation on the pow-
ers of the data protection authorities identical to that in Article 3 of the 
Safe Harbour Decision, which the CJEU considered invalid. Therefore, 
the Commission announced it would prepare a decision replacing that 
provision in all existing adequacy decisions and also engage in a regular 
assessment of existing and future adequacy decisions, as the CJEU had 
required.
Following the judgment, the Irish supervisory authority is required 
to examine Schrems’ complaint with all due diligence and, at the con-
clusion of its investigation, it has to decide whether, pursuant to the 
Directive, transfer of the data of Facebook’s European subscribers to the 
United States should be suspended on the ground that the US does not 
afford an adequate level of protection of personal data.
29 Schrems (n 10) recital 95
30 See Commission (n 1).
31 See list of countries in ‘Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of 
Personal Data in Third Countries’ (European Commission: Justice) <http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm> accessed 1 De-
cember 2015.
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4 The context and implications of the ruling 
The Schrems judgment is in line with the rest of the case law, where 
the CJEU has taken a hard line on the interpretation of EU data privacy 
law, such as: 
- in the Digital Rights Ireland case,32 where the CJEU declared 
the EU Data Retention Directive invalid on the basis that the 
Directive lacked safeguards that limit government collection 
and access to individuals’ data, and that it also omitted con-
trols over what the data can be used for; 
- in the Google Spain case33 (‘the right to be forgotten’), where 
the CJEU established the principle of the applicability of EU 
data protection rules to a search engine;
- in the Ryneš case,34 where the CJEU found that domestic vid-
eo surveillance which films a public area cannot be exempt 
from the obligations contained in the EU Data Protection Di-
rective by virtue of the ‘household exemption’;
- in the Weltimmo case,35 where the jurisdiction of the national 
data protection commissioners is even more enhanced: the 
CJEU ruled that more than one national data protection au-
thority could have competence to regulate multinational busi-
ness, irrespective of where that business has its registered 
office in the EU. 
One must note that all of the cited judgments were brought within a 
short time, which corresponds to the start of negotiations for the new EU 
data protection regulation.36 
At the heart of the Schrems case is the question whether the US en-
sures an adequate level of data protection in order to prevent the abuse 
of private data. Basically, the problem was that the rules of the Safe 
Harbour principle could be overridden by national security requirements 
set out in US law. This is a question that was discussed well before the 
Schrems case began. As mentioned above, back in 2002 and 2004, and 
then again in 2013, the Commission issued implementation reports in 
which it recognised weaknesses in the Safe Harbour system. On all oc-
32 Case C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
33 Case C‑131/12 Google Spain and Google ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.3
34 Case C‑212/13 František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů EU:C:2014:2428.
35 ,Case C-230/14 Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:639.
36 See: ‘Reform of the Data Protection Legal Framework in the EU’ (European Commission: 
Justice), <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm> accessed 1 
December 2015. 
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casions, the Commission, however, preferred to work closely with the 
US institutions to improve the enforcement of the Agreement in the US 
rather than to review the content of the adequacy decision.
In addition, the Schrems case should be read in a wider context, 
in relation to Edward Snowden’s allegation in 2013 of extensive, global, 
internet, and phone surveillance by US intelligence, which included Eu-
ropean Union offices in the US and Europe, as well as high-ranking EU 
politicians and Member State heads of state and government.37 Following 
these revelations, on 12 March 2014 the European Parliament adopted 
a Resolution38 on the electronic mass surveillance of EU citizens. With 
its vote (285 votes to 281), the Parliament decided to call on EU Mem-
ber States to ‘drop any criminal charges against Edward Snowden, grant 
him protection and consequently prevent extradition or rendition by third 
parties, in recognition of his status as whistle-blower and international 
human rights defender’. 
Taking all the above into consideration, the CJEU’s ruling in the 
Schrems case should have been expected. Following the judgment, the 
European Parliament adopted a Resolution39 on 29 October 2015 stating 
that the Schrems case had confirmed the long-standing position of Parlia-
ment regarding the lack of an adequate level of protection under the Safe 
Harbour instrument. Additionally, in the Resolution, the Parliament 
urges the Commission to assess the legal impact and implica-
tions of the Court of Justice ruling of 6 October 2015 in the 
Schrems case (C-362/14) vis-à-vis any agreements with third 
countries allowing for the transfer of personal data, such as 
the EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) 
Agreement, passenger name record (PNR) agreements, the 
EU-US umbrella agreement and other instruments under EU 
law which involve the collection and processing of personal 
data.
Taking into account the findings of the Court on the US mass-sur-
veillance of EU citizens, it is proper and desirable to encourage the Euro-
pean Commission to review all other instruments for cross-border trans-
37 See ‘Attacks from America: NSA Spied on European Union Offices’ (Spiegel Online In-
ternational, 29 June 2013) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nsa-spied-on-
european-union-offices-a-908590.html> accessed 28 November 2015.
38 European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance pro-
gramme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citi-
zens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs 
(2013/2188(INI)).
39 European Parliament Resolution of 29 October 2015 on the follow-up to the European 
Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the electronic mass surveillance of EU citizens 
(2015/2635(RSP)).
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fers of personal data to the US. However, this will most certainly have an 
impact on the cross-border economy, and US companies are struggling to 
find other applicable procedures for transferring EU personal data. And 
this is a challenge. 
Following the ruling, the Article 29 Working Party – an independent 
advisory body that brings together representatives of all data protection 
authorities of the Member States as well as the European Data Protection 
Supervisor – issued a Statement40 on the implementation of the Schrems 
judgment:
urgently calling on the Member States and the European in-
stitutions to open discussions with US authorities in order 
to find political, legal and technical solutions enabling data 
transfers to the territory of the United States that respect fun-
damental rights. 
Additionally, the Statement says: 
In the meantime, the Working Party will continue its analy-
sis on the impact of the CJEU judgment on other transfer 
tools. During this period, data protection authorities consider 
that Standard Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate 
Rules can still be used. In any case, this will not prevent data 
protection authorities to investigate particular cases, for in-
stance on the basis of complaints, and to exercise their pow-
ers in order to protect individuals.
And it goes on to conclude:
If by the end of January 2016, no appropriate solution is 
found with the US authorities and depending on the assess-
ment of the transfer tools by the Working Party, EU data pro-
tection authorities are committed to take all necessary and 
appropriate actions, which may include coordinated enforce-
ment actions.
Accordingly, and in line with this Statement, the European Commis-
sion issued a guidance document41 relating to transatlantic data trans-
fers after the Schrems ruling. In the guidance, the Commission joins the 
Article 29 Working Party in the position that alternative tools authorising 
data flows can still be used by companies for lawful data transfers to 
third countries, including to the US. These alternative tools are standard 
40 ‘Statement of the Article 29 Working Party’ (European Commission: Justice)   <http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommenda-
tion/index_en.htm>  accessed 28 November 2015
41 See Commission (n 1).
272 Marina Škrinjar Vidović: Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner...
contractual clauses under Article 26(4) of the Directive42 (which specify 
data protection obligations and are pre-approved by the Commission), 
binding corporate rules43 (for transfers within a multinational corporate 
group, which are pre-approved by the national Data Protection Authori-
ties), and derogations under Article 26(1)(a) of the Directive.44 
Pursuant to the Commission guidance document, reliance on the 
defined alternative tools is subject to two conditions: (1) transfers to a 
third country can be lawfully made only if the data have originally been 
collected and further processed by a data controller established in the EU 
in accordance with the applicable national laws transposing Data Protec-
tion Directive; and, (2) where the Commission does not find adequacy, 
controllers are responsible for making sure that transfers take place with 
sufficient safeguards. Compliance with these requirements is ultimately 
assessed by national data protection authorities. This means that data 
protection authorities play a central role as they are the main enforcers of 
the fundamental rights of data subjects and are responsible for supervis-
ing data transfers from the EU to third countries, in full independence. 
In the guidance document, the Commission invites data controllers to 
cooperate with the data protection authorities, thereby helping them to 
effectively carry out their supervisory role.
42 See ‘Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries (European 
Commission: Justice) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-trans-
fers/transfer/index_en.htm> accessed 1 December 2015
43 See ‘Overview on Binding Corporate Rules’ (European Commission: Justice)  <http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/binding-corporate-rules/in-
dex_en.htm> accessed 1 December 2015
44 Article 26(1) of the Directive: ‘1. By way of derogation from Article 25 and save where 
otherwise provided by domestic law governing particular cases, Member States shall pro-
vide that a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country which does not 
ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25(2) may take place 
on condition that:
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer; or
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and 
the controller or the implementation of precontractual measures taken in response to the 
data subject’s request; or
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in 
the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third party; or
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest grounds, or for 
the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or
(f) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations is intended 
to provide information to the public and which is open to consultation either by the public 
in general or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent that the 
conditions laid down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case.’
Only one of the above named legal bases has the potential for massive data transfer. Data 
controllers may use clauses in consumer contracts as ‘unambiguous consent’ waiving EU 
protection under Article 26(1)(a) of the Data Protection Directive. But these boilerplate 
clauses may not be informed consent or withstand challenge under EU privacy or unfair 
contract terms law.
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However, in the Commission’s view, a renewed and sound frame-
work for transfers of personal data to the US remains a key priority. The 
Commission states that it hopes to conclude the negotiations with the 
US government on a new arrangement for transatlantic data transfers 
within three months, coinciding with the end of the ‘grace period’ which 
the Article 29 Working Party has implicitly granted until the end of Janu-
ary 2016.
In the meantime, companies are forced to either violate the Euro-
pean data protection rules and share the personal information as ordered 
by US authorities, or they can refuse to share the information and be at 
risk of penalties for not responding to a request from the US government. 
In this regard, an important case is continuing in the US that deals with 
the question of surveillance and EU data protection rules: US Department 
of Justice v Microsoft. The issue of the case is that the US Department of 
Justice wants access to a customer’s data relevant to a drug trafficking 
investigation, stored on a Microsoft server in Ireland. While Microsoft 
said it would not give the information without an Irish court consenting 
to it, the Department of Justice said that because Microsoft is an Ameri-
can company and can access the data, the warrant that it produced is 
valid.45 This case is further proof of the need for agreement on common 
US/EU standards on privacy protection, and for the development of a 
new framework for facilitating legal, transparent law enforcement data 
requests across borders.
5 Conclusion
We are living in the information world, and information represents 
power. Rapid technological developments have brought new challenges 
for the protection of information. The EU and the US are each other’s 
most important trading partners, and data transfers, increasingly, form 
an integral part of their commercial exchanges. Brutal terror attacks and 
technological innovations making large-scale communications data mon-
itoring possible have further complicated the matter, triggering concerns 
about violations of the rights to privacy and data protection in the name 
of national security protection. A transatlantic dialogue is needed not 
only on guiding principles for intelligence collaboration, but more gener-
ally on the appropriate limits of surveillance in the age of big data.




net-privacy/microsoft-vs-doj-the-battle-for-privacy-in-the-cloud.html>  accessed 28 No-
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According to the EU, building trust in the online environment is a 
key to economic development. Lack of trust makes consumers hesitate to 
buy online and adopt new services. This risk is slowing down the devel-
opment of innovative uses of new technologies. Therefore, personal data 
protection plays a central role in the Digital Agenda for Europe,46 and 
more generally in the Europe 2020 Strategy.47 Accordingly, in January 
2015 the European Commission revealed a draft of its European Data 
Protection Regulation to replace the present Data Protection Directive.48 
The completion of this reform is a policy priority for 2015.49 
In line with CJEU case law, the Regulation should confirm and even 
enhance the powers and independence of national data protection au-
thorities, with the final aim of putting control of personal data back in 
the hands of European citizens. One can also expect that, in accordance 
with the case law, the focus of the Regulation will be on the protection of 
privacy and respect for data protection, while the free movement of data 
seems to come a poor second whatever the data industry and the legal 
basis for the Directive might have to say.50
On both sides of the Atlantic, the Court’s decision in the Schrems 
case was received with great attention by politicians and businesses. The 
Commission immediately announced it would renegotiate the scheme51 
under which personal data would be transferred from the EU to the US. 
Even though the US and European regulators are negotiating an updated 
Safe Harbour framework, the timetable of its enactment is unclear.
The implications of Schrems go much wider than just the invalidity 
of EC Decision 2000/520. The judgment has brought into clear view the 
conflict of laws between Europe and the US. While the US has viewed the 
data privacy issue mainly as a matter of commerce and at the same time 
subject to use at the sole discretion of the state, the EU views it as a mat-
ter of fundamental human rights. As the US companies (Safe Harbour or 
not) cannot escape or opt out of the current US surveillance programmes, 
based on the views expressed in Schrems it is difficult to see how any 
form of transfer can be said to adequately protect personal data.
46 Communication from the Commission of 19 May 2010 to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
– A Digital Agenda for Europe COM (2010) 245 final, not published in the Official Journal.
47 Communication from the Commission of 3 March 2010 – Europe 2020: A Strategy for 
Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth COM (2010) 2020 final.
48 ‘Reform of the Data Protection Legal Framework in the EU’ (European Commission: Jus-
tice) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm> accessed 28 No-
vember 2015.
49 ‘Protection of Personal Data’ (European Commission: Justice) <http://ec.europa.eu/jus-
tice/data-protection/index_en.htm> accessed 28 November 2015.
50 See Woods (n 8).
51 Commission (n 1).
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The question underlying the Schrems case is the scope and extent of 
the lawful state surveillance of citizens. This ruling will be very useful for 
the fight against mass surveillance in Europe. EU Member States do not 
all have the same position in respect of the scope of state surveillance.52 
In 2013 the EU Parliament adopted on that issue a Resolution53 where it 
...expresses serious concern at the revelations relating to 
the alleged surveillance programmes run by Member States, 
either with the help of the US National Security Agency or 
unilaterally; calls on all the Member States to examine the 
compatibility of such programmes with EU primary and sec-
ondary law, in particular Article 16 TFEU on data protection, 
and with the EU’s fundamental rights obligations deriving 
from the ECHR and the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States.
On the other hand, we should take into account the latest events fol-
lowing the recent terrorist attack in Paris, and warnings and announce-
ments of other attacks in EU capitals which significantly endanger the 
safety of EU citizens. It is expected that the situation of emergency will 
certainly increase the activities of security agencies and state surveil-
lance. 
In the context of empowering national data protection authorities by 
the CJEU case law, Member States may differ in defining standards of 
the protection of personal data of its citizens. Therefore, even if the Eu-
ropean Commission and the US agree on a new Safe Harbour scheme, in 
accordance with the powers defined in the Schrems case, national data 
protection authorities may still restrict data transfers in cases where they 
feel that the privacy rights of data subjects are violated. This is why it is 
necessary to reach a political agreement between EU Member States on 
state surveillance issues, in order to have a common position in negotiat-
ing with the US the new Safe Harbour 2.0, and to find a commonly agreed 
balance between state surveillance in the name of national security and 
the protection of private data as a human right.
52 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Surveillance by Intelligence Ser-
vices: Fundamental Rights Safeguards and Remedies in the EU: Mapping Member States’ 
Legal Frameworks (FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2015). 
53 European Parliament Resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security Agency 
surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on 
EU citizens’ privacy (2013/2682(RSP)).
